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British Inheritance Legislation: 
Discretionary Distribution at Death 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In 1975 Parliament enacted the Inheritance (Provision for Family and Depen-
dants) Act, I altering in significant respects the balance struck in England between 
testamentary freedom and family protection. 2 After more than a century during 
which testators had been at liberty to dispose of their property as they wished,3 
the Inheritance Act of 19384 had partially restricted a testator's freedom by 
permitting certain relatives to apply to the court for maintenance from his estate, 
regardless of his testamentary dispositions.5 The 1975 Act expands the scope of 
the 1938 Act, giving courts the power to make "reasonable provision"6 out of a 
decedent's estate not only for those relatives covered by the 1938 Act, but also for 
de facto dependants. 7 The 1975 Act further provides that a court making an 
award to a surviving spouse need no longer be guided by a maintenance stan-
dard,8 but may make an award of any sum reasonable under all the circum-
stances, "whether or not it is required for maintenance."9 Although the Act lists a 
I. Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependants) Act, 1975, ch. 63 [hereinafter cited as Inheri-
tance Act 1975). 
2. Family protection and freedom of testation are not the only values which may be furthered by 
succession laws. See L. SIMES, PUBLIC POLICY AND THE DEAD HAND (1955); Gaubatz, Notes Toward a Truly 
Modern Wills Act, 31 U. MIAMI L. REV. 497, 501-16 (1977); and Gold, Freedom of Testation: The Inheritance 
(Family Provision) Bill, I MOD. L. REv. 296, 296-98 (1938). A detailed discussion of these values is beyond 
the scope of this Comment. For discussions of modern American policy regarding succession law, see 
Shaffer, Death, Property and Ideals, in DEATH, TAXES AND FAMILY PROPERTY 26 (E. Halbach ed. 1977); 
Friedman, The Law of Succession in Social Perspective, in DEATH, TAXES AND FAMILY PROPERTY 9 (E. 
Halbach ed. 1977); and Haskell, Restraints upon the Disinheritance of Family Members, in DEATH, TAXES AND 
FAMILY PROPERTY 105 (E. Halbach ed. 1977). For a comparative analysis of modern inheritance law 
policies in four industrialized, Western countries, see M. GLENDON, STATE, LAW AND FAMILY 279-89 
(1977) (noting an apparent trend in family protection away from protecting those with blood ties to the 
decedent, and in favor of the surviving spouse). 
3. The Dower Act of 1833 had abolished the last effective device of English common law for family 
protection from disinheritance. 3 & 4 Wm. 4, ch. 105. See infra text accompanying notes 18-22. 
4. Inheritance (Family Provision) Act, 1938, I & 2 Geo. 6, ch. 45 [hereinafter cited as Inheritance Act 
1938). 
5. /d. § 1(1). 
6. Inheritance Act 1975, supra note I, § 1(1); compare Inheritance Act 1938, supra note 4, § 1(1). 
7. Inheritance Act 1975, supra note I, § 1 (I)(e). 
8. Awards to other applicants continue to be limited by the maintenance standard, as they were 
under the 1938 Inheritance Act. Id. § 1 (2)(b). 
9. /d. § 1(2)(a). 
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number of factors to be considered by the court in arriving at a decision,lO the 
amount to be awarded is left to the court's discretion. 11 
This English legislation and the experience under it are of interest to Amer-
icans in a period when family-protection aspects of succession legislation are 
undergoing re-examination. 12 This Comment will explore whether the English 
experiment with discretionary distribution has any lessons for American law 
reform in the area. 
The Comment begins by tracing the history of family-oriented limits on 
testamentary freedom in English law. It then discusses the legislative history of 
the 1975 Act and presents a detailed account of the Act's provisions. A number 
of cases brought under the Act are then surveyed. In order to facilitate a 
comparison between the American and English systems, the author presents a 
brief outline of family-oriented protective devices in American succession law. 
Next, the Comment discusses a number of defects in the American law as 
perceived by other writers. The Comment concludes with an analysis of the 
English discretionary method of distribution as a proposed remedy for some of 
these defects. The author suggests that the English discretionary system of estate 
distribution is not an ideal remedy for the defects of American succession law. 
II. THE BACKGROUND OF FAMILy-ORIENTED LIMITS ON 
TESTATION IN ENGLISH LAW 
In the Middle Ages, succession law in England provided for the surviving 
spouse and children of a testator, regardless of the testator's intent. Matters of 
probate with respect to personal property were primarily settled by ecclesiastical 
courts even until the nineteenth century.13 In these matters the ecclesiastical 
10. Id. § 3(1). 
II. Id. 
12. A 1978 study of public attitudes about American succession laws revealed significant divergences 
between what people thought was the law, what they thought it should be, and what it actually was. 
Significantly, the study found that people thought intestacy laws should provide that the surviving 
spouse should receive the entire estate, rather than merely a fraction. Fellows, Simon & Rau, Public 
Attitudes About Property Distributioo at Death and Intestate Successioo Laws in the United States, 1978 AM. B. 
FOUND. RESEARCH J. 319. Broader questions of social and legal importance were raised at the American 
Assembly sponsored by the Real Property, Probate and Trust Law Section of the American Bar 
Association in 1976. The essays presented to the Assembly are collected in DEATH, TAXES AND FAMILY 
PROPERTY (E. Halbach ed. 1977). Three essays treat the problem of law reform vis-a-vis family 
protection: Haskell, supra note 2; Friedman, supra note 2; and Shaffer, supra note 2. 
13. Helmholz, Legitim in English Legal Histary, 1984 U. ILL. L. REV. 659,659. See also THE SPECIAL 
AND GENERAL REPORTS MADE TO HIS MAJESTY BY THE COMMISSIONERS ApPOINTED TO INQUIRE INTO THE 
PRACTICE AND JURISDICTION OF THE EcCLESIASTICAL COURTS IN ENGLAND AND WALES 11-12, 25-43 
(1832). The probate jurisdiction of the ecclesiastical courts was officially revoked by the Court of 
Probate Act, 1857,20 & 21 Vict., ch. 77. For the current state of probate jurisdiction, see the Supreme 
Court Act, 1981, ch. 54, § 25 (probate jurisdiction vested in the High Court); Administration of Estates 
Act, 1925, 15 & 16 Geo. 5, ch. 23 (an intestate's estate "shall vest in the Probate Judge in the same 
manner and to the same extent as formerly in the case of personal estates it vested in the ordinary." Id. § 
9). 
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courts took the Civil Law as their guide. 14 The Civil Law principle of legitim 
provided that a surviving spouse was to take one-third of the estate, and surviv-
ing children were to take among them another third. 15 The right to legitim was 
not uniformly enforced, 16 however, and by the fourteenth century it had become 
merely a local custom persisting in York and London. 17 The Act of 172418 
abolished the custom of legitim in London, where it had lingered the longest, thus 
ending restraint in England on the testamentary disposition of personal prop-
erty. 
The most significant restraint on the devise of land existed in the form of 
dower, by which the wife was given a protected life interest in each freehold 
estate of inheritance of which her husband was seised at any moment during 
their marriage. 19 The effectiveness of dower as a protective measure, however, 
was severely curtailed by an 1822 decision of the Court of King's Bench. In the 
case of Ray v. Pung,2o that Court sanctioned the use of a device by which a 
husband could defeat his wife's dower interest. 21 The Dower Act of 183322 
allowed the husband the right to extinguish dower explicitly, either by deed or 
by will. 
After 1833, therefore, a system of complete freedom of testation prevailed in 
England. This system was almost unprecedented in history. 23 The English system 
14. The ecclesiastical courts generally applied principles of the Canon Law developed by the Roman 
Catholic Church for its own use and adopted by the Church of England. The Canon Law was based on 
the Roman and Civil Laws, and the English Church courts borrowed Civil Law principles to decide 
matters of probate, for which the Canon Law had never developed rules of its own. M. RHEINSTEIN & M. 
GLENDON, THE LAW OF DECEDENTS' ESTATES 16, n.4 (1971). 
15. See generally 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 348-56 (2d ed. 1899); 2 
W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *491-96. The term "legitim" is used here to refer to the portions 
reserved to both the surviving spouse and children, although some writers have limited its use to the 
children's portion, calling the portion of the surviving spouse the "terce" or 'Jus relictae." See, e.g., M. 
RHEINSTEIN & M. GLENDON, supra note 14, at 84. 
16. Helmholz, supra note 13, at 666-67. 
17. [d. at 667. See also H. SWINBURNE, TREATISE OF TESTAMENTS AND LAST WILLS, pt. 3, § 18 (1640) 
(on York, where Swinburne was a judge); and C. CARLTON, THE COURT OF ORPHANS 47 (1974) (on 
London). Commentators have suggested various reasons for the disappearance of the enforceable right 
to a fixed share. One commentator has attributed the disappearance to the inconvenience of com-
municating with a forced heir who might well be far abroad in the era of English overseas expansion. See 
M. RHEINSTEIN & M. GLENDON, supra note 14, at 83-84. The statute which abolished the Custom of 
London states that the Custom was seen as discouraging merchants "of wealth and ability" from 
becoming citizens of the city - with the attendant loss of revenues to the city. 11 Geo. I, ch. 18, § 17 
(1724). See Helmholz, supra note 13, at 670-72; C. CARLTON, supra, at 42 (1974). 
18. 11 Geo. I, ch. 18 (1724). 
19. For the classical description of dower, see 2 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *129-39. 
20. 5 B. & Ald. 561 (1822). 
21. In Ray v. Pung, the husband had arranged to have a parcel of land conveyed to him in fee simple, 
but with a power of appointment. While dower would have protected his wife from any conveyance he 
might have attempted of the fee simple, the court held it ineffective against his appointment by deed. 
Thus the fee simple passed through the appointment, free and clear of the wife's dower. /d. 
22. 3 & 4 Wm. 4, ch. 105 (1833). 
23. The noted nineteenth-century legal sociologist Max Weber could find "evidence of complete or 
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was regarded as somewhat of an historical accident,24 and stood in marked 
contrast to the Continental systems. 25 Indeed, Continental legal scholars, wrote 
Otto Kahn-Freund in 1938, found it "difficult to explain why - unlike any other 
European system of law - English law has so far omitted to protect a testator's 
family against arbitrary dispositions by will."26 Unprecedented historical accident 
or not, complete testamentary freedom came to be an accepted, even cherished, 
aspect of English law. 27 
Nonetheless, English legal commentators and lawmakers began to question 
the concept of complete testamentary freedom, especially after the enactment in 
New Zealand,2M Australia,29 and the Canadian provinces30 of family-oriented 
restrictions on testamentary freedomY New Zealand had been the first to enact a 
statute limiting testamentary freedom, and it was the success claimed for the 
New Zealand experience32 that finally convinced the English lawmakers to afford 
almost complete substantive freedom of testation" only twice in history - in England and in the 
Republic of Rome. M. WEBER, LAW IN ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 137 (M. Rheinstein ed. 1954). 
24. 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, supra note 15, at 355; 3 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH 
LAW 438-40 (1909); Keeton and Gower,Freedom of Testatiun in English Law, 20 IOWA L. REV. 326 (1935). 
25. On Continental systems, see Kahn-Freund, Freedom of Testatiun: TIw [1938 Inheritance (Family 
Provisiun)] Bill Compared with the Continental Systems, 1 MOD. L. REv. 296, 304-06 (1938). Professor 
Kahn-Freund served as a consultant to the Law Commissioners in the preparation of their recommen-
dations to Parliament preceding the enactment of the 1975 Act. THE LAW COMMISSION, SECOND REPORT 
ON FAMILY PROPERTY: FAMILY PROVISION ON DEATH, Law Com. No. 61, app. 2 (1974). 
26. Kahn-Freund, supra note 25, at 304. 
27. 
To the modern Englishman our modern law, which allows the father to leave his children 
penniless, may seem so obvious that he will be apt to think it deep-rooted in our national 
character. But national character and national law react upon each other, and law is sometimes 
the outcome of what we must call accidents. 
2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, supra note 15, at 355. The vigor with which attempts at reform were 
rebuffed is indicative of the strength of English affinity for freedom of testation. See Gold, supra note 2, 
at 298-99. One of the most interesting arguments advanced against change was that the reform 
proposals were "a mere tinkering with the problem;" that there was nothing wrong with freedom of 
testation - the real problem was that women lacked the means to support themselves, and the real 
solution would come only when women achieved true economic parity. See 71 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) 
37 (1928). 
28. Testator's Family Maintenance Act of 1900, N.Z. Stat. (1900), No. 20. See generally Dainow, 
Restricted Testation in New Zealand, Australia and Canada, 36 MICH. L. REV. 1107 (1938). 
29. Widows and Young Children's Maintenance Act, Vict. Stat., 6 Edw. 7, No. 2074 (1906); Testator's 
Family Maintenance Act of 1914, Queens Stat., 5 Geo. 5, No. 26 (1914); Testator's Family Maintenance 
and Guardianship of Infants Act, N.S.W. Stat., No. 41 (1916); Testator's Family Maintenance Act, So. 
Aust. Stat., 9 Geo. 5, No. 1327 (1918); Guardianship of Infants Act, West. Aust. Stat., 11 Geo. 5, No. 15 
(1920); Testator's Family Maintenance Act, Tas. Stat., 3 Geo. 5, No.7 (1912), 6 Geo. 5, No. 65 (1915). 
See generally Dainow, Restricted Testation in New Zealand, Australia and Canada, supra note 28. 
30. Testator's Family Maintenance Act, Brit. Col. Stat., 10 Geo. 5, ch. 94 (1920); Dependants Relief 
Act, Ont. Stat., 19 Geo. 5, ch. 47 (1929); Widows Relief Act, Alberta Stat., ch. 18 (1910), Stat., ch. 4 
(1919); Widows Relief Act, Sask. Stat., ch. 25 (1928-29); Dower Act, Man. Stat., ch. 26 (1919). See 
generally Dainow, Restricted Testation in New Zealand, Australia and Canada, supra note 28. 
31. On the legislative history leading to the enactment of the Inheritance Act of 1938, see Dainow, 
Limits on Testamentary Freedom in England, 25 CORNELL L.Q. 337 (1940). 
32. Id. at 345. See also Gold, supra note 2, at 299-300. The New Zealand statute was said to have 
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a decedent's spouse and dependant children some protection from disinheri-
tance. 33 Thus in 1938 Parliament enacted the Inheritance (Family Provision) 
Act. 34 
While reverting in the 1938 Act to a measure of restriction on testamentary 
freedom, the English borrowed from New Zealand a novel method of accom-
plishing the restriction: they would allow the probate judge discretion to alter a 
decedent's will if "reasonable provision"35 had not been made for the mainte-
nance of the decedent's spouse or children. 36 Judges sitting in review of early 
applications for provision under the 1938 Act repeatedly protested the difficul-
ties of their task. 37 Commentators criticized the early reported decisions for the 
failure of probate judges to exercise discretion to restrain testamentary freedom 
in favor of the family,3~ especially when the failure to do so seemed to run 
counter to the policy of the 1938 Act. 39 For example, while the Act was conceived 
in part as a way of relieving the State of possible welfare burdens by delegating 
the duty of support to the family, a number of early decisions refused to order 
family provision out of a decedent's estate for the explicit reason that public 
funds were available to the applicant. 40 Also, judges discriminated against appli-
cations by widowers, "as they could be expected to maintain themselves,"41 
although no such policy was expressed in the 1938 Act. 42 Despite these early 
growing pains, however, the 1938 Act survived as an accepted part of English 
practice.43 
resulted in no excessive litigation, and also to be a deterrent to a testator who might wish to disinherit his 
family. Robson, Freedom of Testation: The [1938 Inheritance (Family Provision)] Bill Compared with the New 
Zealand System, I MOD. L. REV. 296, 302-04 (1938). 
33. Dainow, Limits on Testamentary Freedom in England, supra note 31, at 345; Gold, supra note 2, at 
299-300; Robson, supra note 32, at 302-04. 
34. I & 2 Geo. 6, ch. 45 (1938). 
35. Id. § 1(1). 
36. A 1934 French study noted that of thirty-one systems which restricted testation at that time, 
twenty-nine prescribed fixed portions to be distributed to certain beneficiaries. Interestingly, Maine and 
Massachusetts were the two exceptions. New Zealand, Australia, and the Canadian provinces were not 
included in this study. See Gold, supra note 2, at 299 (citing DE BOURBOUSSON, Du MARIAGE, DES REGIMES 
MATR1MON1AUX, DES SUCCESSIONS (1934»; see also Fratcher, Toward Uniform Succession Legislation, 41 
N.Y.U. L. REv. 1037,1055-56 (1966) (comparing the situation in Maine to the New Zealand and English 
legislation). 
37. See, e.g., Re Joslin, [1941]1 All E.R. 302, 305 (Farwell,].), cited in Unger, The Inheritance Act and the 
Family, 6 MOD. L. REV. 215, 224 n.42 (1943). 
38. See Unger, supra note 37, at 225-28. 
39. Id. 
40. See, e.g., In re Catmull, deed., [1943] Ch. 262; In re Vrint, [1940] Ch. 920, cited in Unger, supra 
note 37, at 225-26. 
41. In re Silvester, [1941] I Ch. 87,89. 
42. See Unger, supra note 37, at 226 (citing In re Silvester, [1941]1 Ch. 87 and In re Styler, [1942] Ch. 
387). 
43. For a positive assessment, written in 1960, of the practice under the 1938 Act, see Crane, Family 
Provision on Death in English Law, 35 N.Y.U. L. REV. 984 (1960). 
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To account for perceived inadequacies,44 Parliament amended the 1938 Act in 
1952, making it applicable to intestacy,45 and extended it in 1958 to entitle 
former spouses to apply for maintenance.46 By the 1960's it had become clear to 
Parliament that experience, new ideas, and changes in society had made neces-
sary a more substantial revision. 47 Parliament therefore entrusted the newly-
formed Law Commission with the task of studying proposals for a complete 
reform of the 1938 ACLIn 1974, after several years of study, the Law Commis-
sion gave Parliament a set of detailed recommendations. 48 Parliament incorpo-
rated these proposed reforms in the Inheritance (Provision for Family and 
Dependants) Act of 1975.49 
Ill. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE 1975 ACT 
A. The Law Commission 
Parliament established the Law Commission in 1965 for the purpose of prom-
oting the reform of the law. 50 The codification and reform of English family law 
stood on the Commission's initial agenda.51 
In their First Annual Report, 52 published in 1966, the Commissioners expressed 
the view that the Inheritance Act of 1938 needed "drastic overhaul."53 To this 
end, the Commissioners produced in 1971 a Working Paper 54 which offered a 
number of choices for the reform of family property law. 
1. 1971: Working Paper 
The Working Paper faced as one of its central problems "the choice between 
discretionary powers and fixed rights as a basis for dealing with family prop-
erty. "55 The Commissioners stated that 
lilt is the discretionary nature of the parties' rights which, as we see 
it, is the fundamental cause of the present dissatisfaction with the law 
44. COMMITTEE ON THE LAW OF INTESTATE SUCCESSION, REPORT, CMD. 8310, ch. 4 (1951). 
45. Intestates' Estates Act, 1952, 15 & 16 Geo. 6 & 1 Eliz. 2, ch. 64. 
46. Matrimonial Causes (Property and Maintenance) Act, 1958,6 & 7 Eliz. 2, ch. 35, § 3. 
47. THE LAW COMMISSION, FIRST PROGRAMME, Law Com. No. I, at 11 (1965). 
48. THE LAW COMMISSION, SECOND REPORT ON FAMILY PROPERTY, supra note 25. 
49. 1975, ch. 63, supra note 1. 
50. Law Commissions Act, 1965, ch. 22, § 1. The Law Commission consists of five prominent judges 
and/or members of the bar, appointed by Parliament. 
51. See THE LAW COMMISSION, FIRST PROGRAMME, supra note 47, at 11. 
52. Law Com. No.4 (1966). 
53. [d. para. 82. The Commissioners gave no explicit reason for this conclusion, but their 1971 
Working Paper cited the discretionary nature of the parties' rights, unfairness to women, and uncertainty 
of property ownership as major sources of dissatisfaction with the law of family property as it then 
stood. THE LAW COMMISSION, WORKING PAPER No. 42, paras. 0.15, 0.21, 0.22 (1971). 
54. THE LAW COMMISSION, WORKING PAPER No. 42, supra note 53. 
55. [d. para. 0.23. 
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[of property distribution on divorce and death]. In effect what 
women are saying, and saying with considerable male su pport, is: -
We are no longer content with a system whereby a wife's rights in 
family assets depend on the whim of her husband or on the 
discretion of a judge. We demand definite property rights, not 
possible discretionary benefits. 56 
211 
The Working Paper noted two other reasons for dissatisfaction with the law of 
family property as it stood in England in 1971. First, the law of family property 
was allegedly unfair: 
[I]t ignores the fact that a married woman, especially if she has 
young children, does not in practice have the same opportunity as 
her husband or as an unmarried woman to acquire property; it takes 
no account of the fact that marriage is a form of partnership to 
which both spouses contribute, each in a different way, and that the 
contribution of each is equally important to the family welfare and to 
society. 57 
The Commissioners also felt the law of family property to be unfair because 
the court now has wider powers to deal with property when a 
marriage is terminated by a decree of divorce ... than it has when a 
marriage ends naturally with the death of one spouse. Thus the final 
irony has been reached: a divorced woman is better protected by the 
law than is a widow. Such is the price of piecemeal law reform. 58 
Other than the discretionary nature of family members' rights and the alleged 
unfairness of family property law, a major source of popular dissatisfaction, 
shared by the Commissioners, was that the law led to uncertainty, particularly in 
relation to ownership of the marital home. 59 
As a basis for discussion, the Working Paper made a number of proposals for 
the reform of family property law. Two of the proposals dealt with the reform of 
the Inheritance Act of 1938.60 The Commissioners proposed as the first alterna-
tive an expansion of the Act of 1938 in order to give the court "wide discretio-
nary powers to 're-write the will' by allocating the property of the deceased in 
order to secure for the surviving spouse a fair share of the family assets, over and 
above her strict maintenance needs."61 Along with this expansion of the surviv-
ing spouse's entitlement under the 1938 Act, the Commissioners proposed an 
56. Id. at 0.22. 
57. /d. at 0.12. citing the ROYAL COMMISSION ON MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE. REPORT 1951-1955, CMD. 
9678. para. 644 (1956). 
58. THE LAW COMMISSION. WORKING PAPER No. 42. supra note 53, at 0.21. 
59. /d. at 0.15-0.16. See also THE LAW COMMISSION. FIRST REPORT ON FAMILY PROPERTY: A NEW 
ApPROACH. Law Com. No. 52. para. 9 (1973). 
60. THE LAW COMMISSION. WORKING PAPER No. 42, supra note 53. pt. 3. 
61. Id. para. 0.34. 
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expansion of the class of entitled applicants to include all children regardless of 
sex, age, or marital status, as well as the decedent's de facto dependants. 62 Under 
this alternative the court would have the power to order property transfers and 
settlements63 and to set aside certain inter vivos transfers made by the decedent. 64 
The Commissioners tentatively agreed that "this would not be an acceptable 
solution, since property rights would be dependent on discretionary powers, and 
great uncertainty, involving litigation and expense, would be introduced into the 
administration of estates."65 
The second alternative reform of inheritance law proposed in the Working 
Paper was a system of "legal rights of inheritance"66 by which a surviving spouse 
and possibly children67 would be entitled to fixed proportions68 of the estate, 
regardless of the terms of the will, or the means, needs, or conduct of the 
applicants.69 The Commissioners felt that this system of fixed rights should not 
replace the system of discretionary distribution under the 1938 Act, but should 
be added to it, so that "the right to apply for family provision should also be 
retained to deal with those cases where legal rights were insufficient for the 
survivor's needs."70 
The Working Paper also suggested reforms which would institute statutory 
co-ownership of the marital home,71 protection of the use and enjoyment of 
household goods,72 and community property.73 Although the Law Commission-
ers contemplated the adoption of some combination of these reforms,74 they felt 
that the institution of fixed legal rights of inheritance would make community 
property unnecessary. These latter two reforms were therefore proposed as 
alternatives. 75 
2. 1973: First Report on Family Property 
The Law Commission consulted a number of groups and individuals concern-
ing the proposals presented in its 1971 Working Paper. 76 Among those who 
62. [d. at 0.35. 
63. [d. 
64. [d. Courts already possessed these latter powers in cases of divorce. [d. 
65. [d. at 0.34. 
66. [d. pt. 4. 
67. The Commissioners thought that children should probably not be included. [d. para. 0.40. 
68. The Commissioners suggested £2,000 or one-third of the estate, whichever was greater. /d. 
69. /d. at 0.36-0.41. 
70. [d. at 0.48. 
71. /d. pt. I. 
72. [d. pt. 2. 
73. /d. pt. 5. 
74. [d. paras. 0.45-0.49. 
75. [d. at 0.37. 
76. For the complete listing, see THE LAW COMMISSION, SECOND REPORT ON FAMILY PROPERTY, supra 
note 25, app. 2; see also THE LAW COMMISSION, FIRST REPORT ON FAMILY PROPERTY, supra note 59, paras. 
3-7. 
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offered their views on the proposals for reform of the inheritance laws were 
several lawyers' professional organizations, women's groups, judges, practition-
ers, and family-law professors.77 
Additionally, the Office of Population Censuses and Surveys sampled public 
opinion about the Commissioners' proposals. 78 This national survey of married 
couples and formerly married people asked respondents about the management 
of their property and finances, their understanding of current family property 
law, and their opinions of some of the proposals made in the Working Paper. 79 
The Law Commissioners published their conclusions in the First Report on 
Family Property: A New Approach.so 
In this First Report, the Commissioners reversed their former position81 and 
recommended an expansion of the 1938 Act to give the court the discretionary 
power to assure that the claim of a surviving spouse upon the family assets 
should be at least equal to that of a divorced spouse.S2 The First Report also 
recommended statutory co-ownership of the marital home. s3 Based on the as-
sumption that Parliament would adopt their recommendations for an expansion 
of the 1938 Family Provision Act and for statutory co-ownership of the marital 
home, the Commissioners felt that there was no need for a system of fixed legal 
rights of inheritances4 or community of property.S5 Not only would the institu-
tion of their recommendations as to discretionary distribution and statutory 
co-ownership sufficiently answer the criticisms of family property law, the Com-
missioners argued, but the addition of fixed rights of inheritance or community 
property would serve merely to create confusion and uncertainty as to what a 
party's property rights really were. 86 
77. See supra note 76. 
78. THE LAW COMMISSION, WORKING PAPER No. 42, supra note 53, para. 0.8. See J. TODD & L. JONES, 
MATRIMONIAL PROPERTY (1972). The results of this survey as regards inheritance are summarized at 
THE LAW COMMISSION, FIRST REPORT ON FAMILY PROPERTY, supra note 59, paras. 35-37. A public 
questionnaire on the Working Paper was also published in The Sun newspaper in 1972. More than 300 
responses were obtained and analyzed. [d. at 6. 
79. THE LAW COMMISSION, WORKING PAPER No. 42, supra note 53, para. 0.8. 
80. THE LAW COMMISSION, FIRST REPORT ON FAMILY PROPERTY, supra note 59. 
81. See supra text accompanying note 65. 
82. THE LAW COMMISSION, .·IRST REPORT ON FAMILY PROPERTY, supra note 59, paras. 40-41. This 
conclusion was based on the results of the Commissioners' consultations and surveys, and a recognition 
of the inherent inequity that a spouse whose behavior may have contributed to a divorce could fare 
better financially upon dissolution of the marriage than might a surviving spouse, since a testator was in 
principle free to disinherit his spouse, subject only to the possibility of a successful action being brought 
by the spouse for the minimal support entitlement allowed under the 1938 Act. See supra text accom-
panying note 58. 
83. [d. at 12-30. "It emerged clearly from the consultation that the principle of co-ownership of the 
matrimonial home is widely supported both as the best means of reforming the law relating to the 
home, and as the main principle of family property law." [d. at 21. 
84. [d. at 45. 
85. /d. at 59. 
86. [d. at 44. 
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3. 1974: Second Report on Family Property 
The Law Commissioners' detailed final recommendations as to expansion of 
the 1938 Act were published in their Second Report on Family Property: Family 
Provision on Death.87 The recommendations would effect four major changes. 
First, the court was to award a surviving spouse such provision as the court felt 
was "a fair or reasonable share of the estate,"88 instead of merely the mainte-
nance which could be awarded under the 1938 Act. The purpose of this provi-
sion was to grant the same powers to a court sitting in an inheritance proceeding 
as were possessed by a court sitting in a divorce matter.89 Second, the Commis-
sioners recommended expanding the class of entitled applicants to include all 
children of the decedent90 - not only those who through age or disability were 
dependent on the decedent - and all de facto dependants, whether or not 
related to the decedent. 91 
Third, the Commissioners recommended giving the court broader powers to 
make financial awards, including the power to order transfers or settlements of 
property,92 or to vary ante-nuptial and post-nuptial settlements. 93 Finally, they 
recommended extending the court's powers of distribution to include both 
property which had been the subject of any gratuitous inter vivos transfer by the 
decedent within six years of his death,94 and property which he had owned 
jointly with other persons. 95 
The Commissioners submitted their Second Report to Parliament on July 29, 
1974. Appended to the Report was a Draft Bill erribodying their final recom-
mendations. 96 
B. Parliament 
1. House of Lords 
The Law Commissioners' Draft Inheritance (Provision for Family and Depen-
dants) Bi1l97 was introduced into Parliament on February 13, 1975.98 The House 
of Lords simultaneously gave the Bill its First Reading. 99 
87. THE LAW COMMISSION, SECOND REPORT ON FAMILY PROPERTY, supra note 25. 
88. ld. para. 17. 
89. ld. at 14, 16. 
90. ld. at 79, 94. 
91. ld. at 94. 
92. ld. at 115. 
93. Jd. at 125. 
94. Jd. at 211,217. 
95. ld. at 14i. 
96. ld. app. I. Explanatory notes were included on the page facing each clause. The persuasive 
authority of these notes was the subject of Parliamentary discussion at 359 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) 
1102-08 (1975). 
97. THE LAW COMMISSION, SECOND REPORT ON FAMILY PROPERTY, supra note 25, app. i. 
98. 356 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) 1423 (1975). 
99. Jd. 
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The Bill was again considered on March 20, 1975.100 The Lord Chancellor 
offered a general explanation of the substantive and policy aspects of the Bill.lol 
Several of the Lords commented on the Bill; even those with some doubts 
welcomed its introduction. 102 After a little over an hour of discussion, the Bill was 
given its Second Reading and sent to a Committee of the Whole House of 
Lords. loa 
The House of Lords resolved itself into Committee and considered the Bill on 
April 24, 1975. 104 The Earl of Mansfield dominated this session, introducing a 
number of amendments which would have constrained the expansiveness of the 
reform proposed by the Law Commissioners.l05 After a debate in which it 
became clear that there was little support among his colleagues for these 
amendments, Lord Mansfield withdrew the amendments, and the Bill was re-
ported out of Committee without amendment. 106 
The Bill received its Third Reading in the House of Lords onJune 24,1975. 107 
Two technical amendments were offered by the Lord Chancellor.l08 These 
amendments were adopted without debate, and the Bill was passed without 
further discussion and sent to the House of Commons. 109 
2. House of Commons 
The House of Commons received the Bill from the House of Lords on July 8, 
1975, and referred it immediately to a Second Reading CommitteeYo This 
100. 358 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) 917-37 (1975). 
101. ld. at 917-22. 
102. See, e.g., the comment of the Earl of Mansfield, id. at 928, that it was "a pleasure to debate 
something ... comparatively non-controversial," despite several points which he would later introduce 
(and withdraw) as amendments in Committee (359 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) 1064-1102 (1975)). 
103. 358 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) 937 (1975). 
104. 359 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) 1064-1109 (1975). 
105. ld. at 1066-90. He proposed, for instance, limiting applications by children to those over 
eighteen years old or disabled, id. at 1064-65; directing the court to "pay some regard to the wishes of 
the testator," id. at 1082; limiting inter vivos transfers which are subject to being ordered repaid into the 
estate by the donee to those made within the last two, instead of six, years before a decedent's death, id. 
at 1084; and not giving the court the power to review other imer vivos transfers at the request of the 
donee who has received property from the testator in a disposition under review by the court, id. at 
1090. 
106. ld. at 1109. 
107. 361 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) 1377-80 (1975). 
108. The first amendment eventually became Clause 24 of the 1975 Act, making it clear that the 
court has discretionary power to make an award out of property that would otherwise pass to the 
Crown, the Duchy of Lancaster, or the Duke of Cornwall as bona vacantia under the Administration of 
Estates Act 1925, because the decedent had left no next ofkin.ld. at 1377-79. The second amendment 
was intended simply to insert references to the 1975 Act into other, pre-existing legislation. ld. at 
1379-80. 
109. /d. at 1380. Several other technical amendments had been made in an eight-minute considera-
tion on May 12. See 360 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) 532-35 (1975). 
110. 895 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 337 (1975). 
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Committee met on July 16, 1975. 111 At this meeting, the Solicitor-General of-
fered a general explanation of the Bill, and two Members offered suggestions 
regarding the scope of entitlement to apply for provision under the Bill. 112 
Agreeing that these suggestions would be considered later,113 the Committee 
voted to recommend a Second Reading,114 which took place without debate on 
July 17, 1975. 115 
The House of Commons again considered the Bill on October 20, 1975. 116 The 
Conservatives offered amendments which would have lessened the sweep of the 
Act's reforms. They proposed that the Act should not entitle dependants, 117 that 
even an award to a surviving spouse should be limited by a maintenance stan-
dard,1I8 and that a court should have no discretion to vary an ante-nuptial or 
post-nuptial settlement. 1I9 The proposed amendments were defeated. 120 The 
Solicitor-General moved a Third Reading,121 and a final discussion of the Bill 
ensued. 122 One Member123 offered the parting parry that "[t]he Government are 
seeking powers in this Bill to deprive an individual of his or her cardinal 
freedom to choose inheritants."124 "I see it," he continued, "as a recipe for 
monumental family squabbles."125 Despite his objections, however, the Bill re-
ceived its Third Reading and was passed without amendment. 126 
The Bill received the Royal Assent on November 12, 1975,127 and came into 
Ill. [d. at 1681-94. 
112. One Member, Mr. Daniel Awdry of Chippenham, was concerned that the Bill did not entitle 
those "who maintain or nurse an old person .... In these cases, it is not the survivor who can be 
described as the dependant [as the Bill would require under § 1(I)(e)] but the deceased." [d. at 1690. 
The other Member, Mr. Charles Fletcher-Cooke of Darwen, suggested an amendment to § 1(1)(e) 
"limiting it to those people who have some sort of ... easily recognizable relationship [to the decedent] 
equivalent to a family relationship." /d. at 1692. He was concerned where the relationship might be 
distant and secret, involving "no residence, acknowledged link or connection of any sort that might be 
described as a family connection .... " /d. 
113. /d. at 1693. 
114. Id. at 1694. 
115. Id. at 1910. 
116. 898 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 169-201 (1975). 
117. Inheritance Act 1975, supra note I, § 1(1)(e). See 898 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 170 (1975). The 
argument was that entitling dependants to apply for provision under the Act would be done at the 
possible expense of the family and would "thrust[] so much social responsibility [in deciding what is fair 
and reasonable in complicated situations] on judges. They are neither trained nor equipped to make 
decisions of this kind." [d. at 174. 
118. 898 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 178 (1975). Inheritance Act 1975, supra note I, § 1(2)(a). 
119. 898 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 180 (1975). Inheritance Act 1975, supra note I, § 2(1)(f). 
120. 898 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 178, 180, 182 (1975). 
121. [d. at 182. 
122. [d. at 183-201. 
123. Mr. Robert Banks, Conservative Member for Harrogate. [d. at 183. 
124. /d. 
125. [d. at 184. 
126. /d. at 20 I. 
127. 365 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) 1968 (1975); 899 PARL. DEB., H.C.(5th ser.) 1628 (1975). 
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force on April I, 1976,128 as the Inheritance (Provision for Family and Depen-
dants) Act 1975. 
C. The 1975 Inheritance Act 
The 1975 Inheritance Act entitles specified persons to apply for provIsIOn 
from a decedent's estate. 129 It gives the court reviewing such an application the 
power to make provision from the estate in disregard of the decedent's will and 
of the intestacy laws. l30 The Act leaves the amount of the award to the court's 
discretion, but gives the court a list of factors to consider in the exercise of that 
discretion. 131 The following is a general description of the Act's provisions. 132 
Section 1 entitles the following classes of persons to apply for "reasonable 
financial provision" from a decedent's estate: spouses,I33 former spouses,I34 chil-
dren,I35 persons whom the decedent "treated ... as a child of the family," 136 and 
persons whom the decedent "maintained, either wholly or partly." 137 Spouses are 
entitled to apply for any award of provision "reasonable in all the circum-
stances."138 All other applicants are limited to awards of maintenance. 139 
Section 2 gives the court power to make orders for financial provision out of 
the estate. 140 Such orders can take the form of periodical payments,141 lump sum 
awards,142 property transfers,I43 or property sales. 144 The court also has the 
128. Inheritance Act 1975, supra note I, § 27(3). 
129. [d. § 1(I)(a)-(e). It is important to remember that the Act is triggered only when a complaint is 
brought by an unhappy would-be legatee. Freedom of testation is restricted only when a successful 
application is brought. 
130. [d. § 2. 
131. [d. § 3. 
132. The text of sections I through 3 of the Act is reproduced in the Appendix to this Comment. 
Exact quotations from the text are given here only when the explicit language is important to an 
understanding of the relevant provisions, or where the language has been the subject of dispute in the 
courts and literature as to its proper construction. 
133. [d. § 1(I)(a). 
134. Unless they have remarried. [d. § 1(1)(b). 
135. [d. § I (J)(c). 
136. [d. § 1(I)(d). 
137. !d. § 1(J)(e). The Act provides that 
[flor the purposes of subsection (I)(e) above, a person shall be treated as being maintained by 
the deceased, either wholly or partiy, as the case may be, if the deceased, otherwise than for full 
valuable consideration, was making a substantial contribution in money or money's worth 
towards the reasonable needs of that person. 
[d. § 1(3). 
138. [d. § I (2)(a). 
139. [d. § 1(2)(b). The distinction between maintenance and reasonable provision without regard to 
need, made in § 1(2)(a) and § 1(2)(b), has existed in English law since the Middle Ages. The right of a 
child to alimenta (basic necessities) was undisputed, but there was authority that the right to legitim (a 
percentage of the estate) could be denied where the child was capable of self-support. See Helmholz, 
supra note 13, at 664 n.32, 670. 
140. Inheritance Act 1975, supra note I, § 2(1). 
141. [d. § 2(I)(a). 
142. [d. § 2(1)(b). 
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power to vary any ante-nuptial or post-nuptial agreement, thus making it effec-
tively impossible to contract out of the Act's reach. 145 
Section 3 gives the court guidelines to consider in deciding whether to make an 
award, and if so, in what amount. 146 The court is directed in Section 3 to consider 
the following: the financial resources and needs of the applicant; 147 the financial 
resources and needs of any other applicant; 148 the financial resources and needs 
of the will's beneficiaries; 149 the obligations and responsibilities which the dece-
dent had to any applicant or beneficiary;150 the size and nature of the net 
estate; 151 physical or mental disabilities of any applicant or beneficiary; 152 and any 
other matter, including the conduct of the parties, which in the circumstances 
the court considers relevant. 153 
In the case of an application by a spouse or former spouse, the court is further 
directed to consider the applicant's age,154 the duration of the marriage,l55 and 
"the contribution made by the applicant to the welfare of the family of the 
deceased, including any contribution made by looking after the home or caring 
for the family."I56 If the applicant is the decedent's surviving spouse, the court 
should also consider the provision which a court might have awarded the appli-
cant in a divorce proceeding. 157 
In applications by children or persons "treated ... as a child of the family,"I58 
the Act directs the court's attention to a consideration of the applicant's educa-
tional needs. 159 In the case of applicants whom the deceased "treated ... as a 
child of the family,"160 or who were dependants of the decedent,161 the court 
must consider the extent to which the decedent had assumed responsibility for 
the applicant's maintenance. 162 
143. Id. § 2(1)(c). 
144. Id. § 2(1)(d). 
145. Id. § 2(l)(f). But see § 15, discussed infra at text accompanying notes 175-76, providing that it is 
possible at divorce to contract out of the Act's reach. 
146. Id. § 3. 
147. Id. § 3(1)(a). 
148. Id. § 3( l)(b). 
149. Id. § 3(1)(c). 
150. Id. § 3(l)(d). 
15t. Id. § 3(1)(e). 
152. Id. § 3(1)(f). 
153. Id. § 3(1)(g). 
154. Id. § 3(2)(a). 
155. Id. 
156. Id. § 3(2)(b). 
157. Id. § 3(2). 
158. Id. § l(l)(d). 
159. Id. § 3(3). 
160. Id. § l(l)(d). 
161. Id. § l(l)(e). 
162. Id. § 3(3)(a), and § 3(4). If the applicant claims to have been "treated ... as a child of the family" 
under § l(l)(d), the court must also consider whether the decedent knew the applicant was not his own 
child, and whether anyone else might be liable for the applicant's maintenance. [d. § 3(3)(b), (c). 
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Section 4 imposes a time-limit of six months, from the date on which "rep-
resentation with respect to the estate of the deceased" is taken, on all applica-
tions.163 The court is given the power to disregard the time-limit, although no 
suggested justifications for doing so are stated. 164 
Section 5 provides the court with the power to make an interim order of 
provision from the estate in the case of an applicant in urgent need of financial 
assistance. 
Section 6 allows for the variation, suspension, or discharge of periodical 
payments previously ordered under section 2,165 in the case of changed circum-
stances. l66 In altering the original order, the court is to consider the same factors 
listed in section 3, pertinent to the original application. 167 Orders made for lump 
sum payments or property transfers are not subject to subsequent variation, 
suspension, or discharge. l68 
Section 7 gives the court power to order that lump sum payments be made in 
installments, 169 and provides that the timing and amount of the installments may 
subsequently be varied. 170 
Sections 8 and 9 include in the decedent's net estate subject to distribution, 
gifts causa mortis 171 and the decedent's severable share of property held in joint 
tenancy. 172 
Sections 10 through 13 give the court the power to recall property which the 
decedent had transferred without full valuable consideration, and with the 
intention of defeating applications for family provision, if the transaction oc-
curred within six years of the decedent's death.173 Section 11 provides that 
contracts to leave property or money by will may also be set aside if made without 
consideration and with the intention of defeating applications under the Act. 
Sections 14 through 18 apply in cases where the applicant is a separated or 
divorced spouse of the decedent. Section 14 gives the court discretion to disre-
gard any decree of divorce or judicial separation made absolute less than twelve 
months prior to the decedent's death. This would allow a former spouse to apply 
in such cases as a spouse, thus entitling the former spouse to more than a simple 
maintenance award. 174 Section 15 gives divorce courts authority to incorporate 
163. [d. § 4. 
164. !d. 
165. [d. § 2(I)(a). 
166. [d. § 6(7). 
167. [d. 
168. See THE LAW COMMISSION. SECOND REPORT ON FAMILY PROPERTY. supra note 25. at paras. 
160-65. 
169. !d. § 7(1). 
170. !d. § 7(2). 
171. !d. § 8. 
172. !d. § 9. 
173. For a commentary on section 10, purporting 10 identify likely problems and propose solutions, 
see Sherrin, Defeating the Dependants, 1978 CONVEYANCER 13. 
174. That is, the applicant could apply under § 1(1)(a) rather than § l(l)(b). 
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into their decrees agreements that neither party will apply for family provision 
on the death of the other. 175 This section also requires that courts not entertain 
applications for family provision from persons subject to such an incorporated 
agreement. 176 Sections 16, 17, and 18 enable the court to review the provisions of 
a maintenance or property settlement agreement in force as part of a decree of 
divorce or judicial separation at the time of the decedent's death. 
Sections 19 through 26 are supplementary, dealing with the effect of orders, 177 
personal representatives,I78 evidentiary matters,179 definitions, ISO and the effect 
of the Act on existing legislation. 181 Section 27 is the enacting section. 
The 1975 Act is a detailed attempt to make English inheritance law more 
responsive to the variety and complexity of modern economic and social condi-
tions. The courts are empowered to make individualized awards of provision 
from decedents' estates, and are directed to have regard for the complexity and 
uniqueness of each applicant's situation. Whether the Act has been successful in 
achieving these goals will be examined in the next section. 
v. CASES BROUGHT UNDER THE 1975 ACT: AN ANALYSIS 
OF JUDICIAL ATTITUDES 
Since the 1975 Act went into effect on April I, 1976, there have been fewer 
than forty reported cases decided under the Act. 182 While it is difficult to 
estimate the number of unreported applications under the Act, these reported 
opinions may give some indication of the judicial attitudes towards applicants. 183 
Three judicial attitudes that find repeated expression in the reported cases call 
into question the effectiveness of the Act as a protective device. First, freedom of 
testation remains the standard by which courts judge a decedent's provision for 
his survivors as to its "reasonable[ness] in all the circumstances." 184 Second, 
courts have expressed concern that the Act may encourage family squabbles, and 
as a result some decisions tend to narrow the scope of the Act's entitlements in 
order to exclude certain applicants. 185 Third, the courts have explicitly discour-
175. Id. § 15(1). 
176. Id. § 15(3), (4). 
177. Id. § 19. 
178. Id. § 20. 
179. Id. § 21. 
180. /d. §§ 23, 25. 
181. Id. §§ 24. 26. 
182. This figure corresponds roughly to the rate at which cases were brought in the initial years after 
the 1938 Act became effective. By 1943, there were eleven reported cases. Unger. supra note 37. at 226. 
227 n.55. 
183. This analysis is not an exhaustive catalogue of all cases brought thus far. nor does it attempt to 
point out all trends worthy of note. It simply notes several trends which may be of particular interest to 
those who might see in the English system a remedy for defects they perceive in American law. 
184. Inheritance Act 1975. supra note 1. § 1(2)(a), (b). See infra text accompanying notes 187-242. 
185. See infra text accompanying notes 243-50. 
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aged litigation, especially as to small estates, because of the costs involved. 186 
A. The Policy of Freedom of Testation 
The court, according to the 1975 Act, must ask whether a testator's provision 
for an applicant was "reasonable in all the circumstances."187 One of those 
circumstances seems to be the long history of, 188 and lingering predilection for,189 
testamentary freedom in England, of which the courts feel compelled to take 
note. "Subject to the court's powers under the 1975 Act and to fiscal demands," 
said the court in In re Coventry, deed., 190 "an Englishman still remains at liberty at 
his death to dispose of his own property in whatever way he pleases, or, if he 
chooses to do so, to leave that disposition to be regulated by the laws of intestate 
succession." 191 
In re Coventry, deed. involved an application by a son against a father's estate. 
The decedent had married in 1927 and bought a house. 192 In 1931 his only child, 
the applicant son, was born. 193 In 1957 the son, then aged 26, returned to live at 
home, and his mother left her husband. 194 After his wife left, the decedent 
contributed nothing to her support. 195 The son worked full-time and lived 
rent-free with his father in exchange for doing domestic work and buying the 
food. 196 In 1961 the son married, and his wife moved in, assuming the household 
responsibilities. 197 They had three children; in 1975, however, she left and took 
the children. 198 One year later, in 1976, the father died, without leaving a will. 199 
Under the intestacy rules, his wife was entitled to his entire estate, which con-
sisted of his two-thirds interest in the house, valued at £7,000. 200 The wife was 74, 
186. See infra text accompanying notes 251-66. 
187. Inheritance Act 1975, supra note I, § 1(2)(a), (b). 
188. See supra, text accompanying notes 23-27. 
189. Re Chatterton. 1980 CONVEYANCER 152. "The decision is perhaps some consolation to those who 
feel that the Act is too easily capable of destroying the testamentary wishes of the deceased." /d. See also 
Cadwallader, A Mistresses' Charter~, 1982 CONVEYANCER 46, 57: 
To those guardians of individual liberty to whom any interference with a man's right to dispose 
of his wealth as he wishes is an anathema, it can be said that a qualified respect for testamentary 
freedom seems to be emerging under the new Act. Although, oddly, the deceased's intentions 
and reasons for his dispositions are not to be found among the factors to which the court's 
attention is specifically directed under section 3, they are nevertheless receiving no little 
consideration in court. ... 
190. [1980] I Ch. 461. 
191. /d. at 474. 




196. /d. at 467. 
197. Id. 
198. /d. 
199. Id. at 464. 
200. Intestates' Estates Act, 1952, supra note 45. The wife already retained the outstanding one-third 
interest. In re Coventry, decd., [1980] I Ch. 461, 464-65. 
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and lived on her state pension in a subsidized apartment. 201 The son, 46, earned 
£52 a week take-home pay, but was under an obligation to pay £12 a week in 
support to his wife and children. 202 
The son applied under § 2 of the 1975 Act, claiming that the intestacy law did 
not make reasonable financial provision for his maintenance. 203 The master in 
charge of the estate awarded the son £2,000 on the basis of his original applica-
tion.204 The son appealed to the trial court, which reversed the master's award 
and left the son with nothing. 205 In considering the son's financial resources as 
directed by the Act,206 the court concluded that he was able to provide for 
himself. The court reasoned that since the father was under no moral obligation 
to the son, the application must faiJ.207 Whether the court's decision turned more 
011 its conclusion that the son was not in need, or on a respect for the father's 
testamentary freedom, is thrown into question by the court's assertion that it was 
not entitled by the Act "to interfere with a deceased person's dispositions simply 
because a qualified applicant feels in need of financial assistance."208 In approv-
ing the trial court's analysis, the Court of Appeal held that the question to be 
answered "is not whether it might have been reasonable for the deceased to assist 
his son ... but whether in all the circumstances, looked at objectively, it is 
unreasonable that the effective provisions governing the estate did not do SO."209 
The result in In re Coventry, deed. is not entirely self-evident, and the court's 
analysis raises the question of what the result would have been had the son been 
left the father's two-thirds interest in the house by will, and the mother were the 
applicant. The father, having left a will, would have made an even clearer 
expression of his wishes. Under the In re Coventry, deed. reasoning the court 
might hold that it was not unreasonable in all the circumstances for the father to 
have left the son everything, and the wife nothing. The son, after all, had been 
living with the father, helping out around the house and buying the food for 
twenty years. On the other hand, the father had not provided for his wife at all 
during those years. "Was it unreasonable that the decedent chose to continue the 
pattern in his will?" the court might ask. 
The respect for testamentary freedom shown in In re Coventry, deed. was 
201. In re Coventry, decd., [1980] 1 Ch. 461, 466. 
202. Id. at 467. 
203. /d. at 464. 
204. /d. at 462. 
205. /d. at 478. 
206. Inheritance Act 1975, supra note I, § 3(l)(a). 
207. In re Coventry, decd., [1980]1 Ch. 461, 474, 477; Inheritance Act 1975, supra note I, § 3(l)(d). 
208. In re Coventry, deed., [1980] 1 Ch. 461, 478. The trial court's opinion wa~.affirmed on appeal. In 
re Coventry, decd., [1980] 1 Ch. 461, 478. 
209. Id. at 488. This is also the approach which had been taken by most courts under the 1938 
legislation, following Re Brownbridge, [1942]193 L.T. Jo. 185. See Unger, supra note 37, at 224 n.42. It 
should be noted that while the statute seeks to ensure "reasonable financial provision," § 1(1), this 
judicial approach asks whether the provision made was unreasonable. 
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followed explicitly in Legat v. Ryder. 210 There, the plaintiff had married the 
decedent in 1955.211 They were divorced in 1968, but remained somewhat 
friendly.2\2 The plaintiff ran a hotel after the divorce, and she gave her former 
husband lodging there for a while. 213 In 1973 the decedent moved in with 
another woman, who became his de facto wife. 214 He died in 1977, leaving a net 
estate of £20,000 to his cohabitant. 215 His former wife applied under § 1 (l)(b) of 
the 1975 Act, claiming that her former husband's will had not made reasonable 
provision for her maintenance.216 She asked for a lump sum award of £4,000-
5,000.217 The lawyers for the estate suggested that £2,000 would be an appropri-
ate award. 218 Despite even this agreement of the estate's attorneys that the 
decedent's former wife was entitled to provision under the Act, the court refused 
her application. 219 The court found that it was "not ... unreasonable"220 for the 
decedent to leave nothing to his former wife. 221 The court expressed the view 
that "[t]he object of the Act is not to award [the applicant] a legacy .... "222 
Cases in which courts have been willing to override the provisions of a will 
have usually involved circumstances in which a particularly large estate was 
involved, with a consequent abundance of funds available for distribution;223 
where a diversion of the funds would not adversely affect the named be-
neficiaries, since they were not in need;224 or where it was shown that the will did 
not correspond to the true intentions of the decedent. 225 
Thus in Re Besterman's Will Trusts 226 the court awarded a widow £378,000 out of 
an estate of £1.5 million.227 She had been married to the decedent for the last 
sixteen years of his life, until he died at the age of 71. 22S He left her his personal 
chattels and £3,000 a year; the rest of his £ 1.5 million estate went to Oxford 
210. Chancery Division (May 2, 1980) (available on LEXIS, Enggen library, Cases file). 












223. See, e.g., Re Besterman's Will Trusts, C.A., 1977 B. No. 5319 (Oct. 18, 1982) (available on 
LEXIS, Enggen library, Cases file); Malone v. Harrison, [1979] I W.L.R. 1353. 
224. See, e.g., Re Besterman's Will Trusts, C.A., 1977 B. No. 5319 (Oct. 18, 1982) (available on 
LEXIS, Enggen library, Cases file); Malone v. Harrison, [1979] I W.L.R. 1353. 
225. /d.; In re Christie, deed., [1979] I Ch. 168. 
226. C.A., 1977 B. No. 5319 (Oct. 18, 1982) (available on LEXIS, Enggen library, Cases file). 
227. Id. 
228. /d. 
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University and the British Museum to continue his literary research. 229 The trial 
court awarded the widow £259,000,230 and the appellate court increased the 
award to £378,000. 231 The court noted that Mr. Besterman left no other rela-
tives. 232 Moreover, the named beneficiaries of the will, Oxford University and the 
British Museum, certainly did not stand in need.233 The court also noted the 
large size of Mr. Besterman's estate. 234 Furthermore, it appeared to the court 
that the decedent thought he was being more generous to his widow than was in 
fact the case. 235 After considering all these factors, the court felt justified in 
overriding the provisions of the will. In so doing, however, the court cautioned 
against applying the logic it used to other cases, especially those involving smaller 
estates. The court noted that "[t]his is a very 'pure' case, ... virtually free from 
any complicating factors .... [I]t would be a pity if this case should be used as a 
basis for drawing general deductions of principle."236 
Malone v. Harrison 237 also involved a very large estate, valued at £480,000 after 
taxes. 238 The decedent had left his de facto wife and her son a considerable 
legacy, and had left his brother shares of stock worth £192,000. 239 The dece-
dent's mistress applied for provision from the estate under the 1975 Act. 240 In 
awarding the mistress provision, the court ordered that the £19,000 award be 
taken from the brother's portion, reducing it by only ten percent and still leaving 
him with £ 173,000.241 Here again, although the court was willing to interfere to a 
229. /d. Mr. Besterman was a devotee of the Enlightenment and apparently considered himself the 
reincarnation of Voltaire! B. HOGGETT & D. PEARL, THE FAMILY, LAW AND SOCIETY 135 (1983). 
230. [1981] 3 F.L.R. 255 (available on LEXIS, Enggen library, Cases file). 
231. Re Besterman's Will Trusts, C.A., 1977 B. No. 5319 (Oct. 18, 1982) (available on LEXIS, 
Enggen library, Cases file). 
232. The court noted that Mrs. Besterman was "the only person to whom it could be said that the 
deceased owed any duty to make provision." Id. Nor was marital conduct at issue. "The plaintiff," said 
the court, "was a faithful and dutiful wife to whom the deceased owed all the duties ordinarily arising 
from the married state." /d. 
233. Id. 
234. "The deceased was not just a wealthy man," said the court. "He was a very wealthy man and that 
is an important factor to be borne in mind in considering what is a reasonable provision for his widow." 
Id. 
235. Mr. Besterman had ordered his executors "to treat her as generously as possible." Id. The court 
speculated that 
/d. 
he had so far lost touch with the real value of money as not to appreciate the reality of her 
needs. That is a phenomenon not uncommonly associated with advancing age, particularly in 
an era of rapidly changing money values. The income which he left her was approximately 
equal to the housekeeping allowance which he had been accustomed to give her and it looks ... 
as if he may have assumed that she would simply go on living at [their home] during her 
widowhood in exactly the same style and manner as she had during his lifetime, but without 
appreciating that he had left her no endowment to enable her to do so. 
236. Id. 
237. [1979] 1 W.L.R. 1353. 
238. Id. at 1354. 
239. Id. at 1362. 
240. /d. at 1354. 
241. Id. at 1366. 
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small extent with the decedent's freedom of testation, it was able to do so without 
appreciably affecting either the beneficiaries or the decedent's chosen pattern of 
distribution. 242 
These cases indicate that the courts have read into the Act a respect for the 
decedent's wishes, thus making testamentary freedom the standard by which to 
judge a decedent's provision for his survivors. Courts generally disregard the 
decedent's expressed intentions only in cases involving large estates, with an 
abundance of funds available for distribution; where the named beneficiaries do 
not stand in need; or where the will did not correspond to the decedent's true 
intentions. 
B. The Privacy of Family Affairs 
Since the Act entitles nearly all family members to apply for provision out of a 
decedent's estate, some members of Parliament feared that the Act would pro-
vide "a recipe for monumental family squabbles."243 A survey of the cases 
reported thus far indicates that this fear may have been justified. In In re 
Coventry, deed. 244 for example, a son applied for provision out of his father's 
estate; the defending beneficiary was his mother. In Re Dennis, 245 a son chal-
lenged dispositions by his father to his mother and to his own children. In In re 
Christie, deed. ,246 a son asked the court to set aside a disposition to his sister.247 Of 
course, the Act by its very nature implies that challenges to a testator's plans will 
for the most part be intra-family challenges, since most of a testator's likely 
beneficiaries, as well as those persons entitled to apply under the Act, are family 
members. 
According to one commentator,248 some courts are acting to mitigate this 
tendency of the Act to encourage family strife, by imposing a requirement that 
an applicant for provision from a decedent's estate show that the decedent had 
assumed responsibility for him or had a moral obligation to provide for him.249 
242. The court in another case made an award to the decedent's former wife because it left the other 
beneficiaries "largely ... unaffected." Re Crawford, [1982]4 F.L.R. 273 (available on LEXIS, Enggen 
library, Cases file). 
243. See supra text accompanying note 125. 
244. [1980] 1 Ch. 461. 
245. [1981] 2 All E.R. 140. 
246. [1979] 1 Ch. 168. 
247. See also, e.g., Re C, decd., 123 SOLIC. J. 35 (1979) (decedent's de facto wife and son versus 
another son of decedent); In re Fullard, decd., 1982 Fam. 42 (former wife versus widow); Re Crawford, 
[1982]4 F.L.R. 273 (available on LEXIS, Enggen library, Cases file) (former wife versus widow); Malone 
v. Harrison, [1979]1 W.L.R. 1353 (mistress versus wife, de facto son, and brother); Re Kirby, [1981]3 
F.L.R. 249 (available on LEXIS, Enggen library, Cases file) (de facto husband of 35 years versus 
decedent's children by former marriage); Re Viner, [1978] C.L.Y. 3091 (sister versus sister). 
248. Cadwallader, supra note 189, at 46. 
249. Id. at 57-58. See, e.g., Re Haig, decd., 76 L. SOC'y GAZ. 476 (1979);/n re Christie, decd., [1979]1 
Ch. 168. The Act directs only that the court, in the exercise of its discretion, "have regard to whether the 
deceased had assumed any responsibility for the applicant's maintenance." Inheritance Act 1975, supra 
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This requirement has the effect of withholding standing to apply from many 
potential applicants, notably adult children and others whom a court might say 
were adequately capable of maintaining themselves. 25o With standing thus re-
stricted, and the scope of the Act's entitlements correspondingly narrowed, the 
likelihood of family strife caused by applications is also reduced. 
c. Costs of Litigation 
In addition to being concerned with preserving testamentary freedom and 
avoiding the encouragement offamily strife, the English appellate judiciary who 
have heard cases arising under the 1975 Act have expressed concern with the 
costs of litigation. A person who feels unjustly left out of a testator's munificence 
- runs the logic - must get a lawyer and bring an application for provision 
under the Act. The beneficiary named under the will or intestacy statute will 
probably also hire a lawyer to contest the application. Both sides may spend a lot 
of money on lawyers. The purpose of a Family Provision Act such as this is to 
distribute money to the deserving family and dependants, not to lawyers. The 
more the parties spend on litigation, the less they will have left for themselves. 251 
The judiciary have responded to their concern about costs by explicitly dis-
couraging litigation, especially in cases involving small estates. In In re Coventry, 
deed. ,252 the entire estate consisted of a decedent's two-thirds' interest in a house, 
valued at £7,000. 253 The two-thirds interest passed by the intestacy statute to the 
decedent's wife, and his son applied under the Act. 254 The master who initially 
heard the case awarded the son £2,000. 255 The son took an appeal. The appellate 
court reversed, leaving the applicant with nothing. Although the court's opinion 
spoke of testamentary freedom 256 and family-strife concerns,257 the court was 
also plainly worried about the litigation costs involved: 
[i]t was reasonable for this plaintiff to receive nothing and for the 
mother ... to receive whatever was left after all this litigation had 
been paid for. ... Particularly in the case of small estates such as this 
note 1, § 3(3)(a). Furthermore, the court is directed to consider such an assumption of responsibility in 
the case only of an application by a person whom the deceased "treated ... as a child" under § 1(l)(d), 
or by a dependant under § 1(1)(e). See supra text accompanying notes 160-62. 
250. Cadwallader, supra note 189, at 57-58. 
251. See, e.g., the sentiment expressed by the Court of Appeal in Allcorn v. Harvey, C.A. (March 25, 
1980) (available on LEXIS, Enggen library, Cases file), that "this is another case where the family have 
become embroiled in disastrous litigation, out of which no-one are the beneficiaries except perhaps the 
lawyers." 
252. (1980) 1 Ch. 461. 
253. [d. at 464-65. 
254. [d. 
255. [d. at 462. 
256. [d. at 474. See supra text accompanying notes 190-209. 
257. [d. at 482. 
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one, appeals ... are strongly to be discouraged .... I regard it as 
little short of disastrous that the plaintiff was advised to contest the 
master's order in this case. 258 
227 
Such language is directed at the lawyers. One commentator has suggested that 
lawyers now obtain written consent from a client who insists on pressing a 
doubtful claim, after advising the client and warning of the consequences. 259 The 
lawyer who fails to advise and warn is likely to be subject to a negligence action 
based on the language of In re Coventry, deed. 260 
The approach of In re Coventry, deed. was followed in Jelley v. Iliffe,261 Re 
Kirby,262 and In re Fullard, deed. 263 In each case the court deplored the pressing of 
claims against small estates, because of the costs to the litigants,264 and approved 
the practice of simply dismissing such claims on the pleadings as stating no 
reasonable cause of action, for the explicit purpose of saving the estate from the 
impact of legal costs. 265 
Thus the courts seem to agree with Mr. Banks' comment during the Com-
mons' debates in 1975, that the Act is "a recipe for monumental family squab-
bles .... laid by the Law Commission, hatched by the Solicitor-General, and ... 
presented for a lawyers' feast."266 The judiciary have reacted by explicitly dis-
couraging litigation, telling lawyers that pressing a doubtful claim may lead to 
liability for negligence, at least in the absence of the client's informed consent, or 
even striking claims on the pleadings as showing no reasonable cause of action. 
The reported cases of the first eight years' practice under the 1975 Inheritance 
Act indicate that applications may be thwarted or discouraged by judicial at-
titudes about testamentary freedom, the privacy of family affairs, and the costs 
of litigation.267 However justified these attitudes mayor may not be,268 they do 
258. /d. at 492. 
259. Bennett, Recent Cases under the Inheritance (Provisiun for Family and Dependants) Act 1975, 130 NEW 
L. J. 565, 566 (1980). 
260. /d. 
261. 1981 Fam. 128. 
262. [1981] 3 F.L.R. 249 (available on LEXIS, Enggen library, Cases file). 
263. 1982 Fam. 42. 
264. Jelley v. Iliffe, 1981 Fam. 128, 138; Re Kirby, [1981]3 F.L.R. 249 (available on LEXIS, Enggen 
library, Cases file) ("[Striking the claim unless it has a real chance of success] may be the only way in 
which an estate of limited value may be preserved from the impact of legal costs which otherwise would 
obliterate it."); In re Fullard, deed., 1982 Fam. 42, 46 ("Where the estate ... is small, the onus on an 
applicant of satisfying the conditions of section 2 is very heavy indeed and these applications ought not 
to be launched unless there is (or there appears to be) a real chance of success, because the result of 
these proceedings simply diminishes the estate and is a great hardship on the beneficiaries if they are 
ultimately successful in litigation."). 
265. Jelley v. Iliffe, 1981 Fam. 128, 138; Re Kirby, [1981]3 F.L.R. 249 (available on LEXIS, Enggen 
library, Cases file); In re Fullard, deed., 1982 Fam. 42,46. 
266. 898 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) 184 (1975). 
267. An additional factor which may discourage a potential applicant is judicial uncertainty about the 
proper statutory construction of some of the Act's provisions. For example, § 3(2), providing that in 
deeiding what if any award to make, a court should consider what the applicant would have gotten on 
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call into question the effectiveness of the Act to provide "reasonable" testamen-
tary disposition to the family and dependants of a testator. A client who is 
discouraged from bringing an application against an estate because of these 
judicial attitudes and the attendant uncertainty of results, has nowhere left to 
turn. He is left out of the will by the decedent, and is forced out of the system by 
the courts. 
VI. FAMILy-ORIENTED PROTECTIVE DEVICES IN 
AMERICAN SUCCESSION LAW 
A. Protective Devices in American Law 
The American colonists brought with them the English succession law of their 
times. 269 This included dower and the legitim, the latter in the form of an 
indefeasible share protected for the surviving spouse only.270 Some states subse-
quently added a homestead allowance, or a support allowance to which the 
surviving spouse was entitled during administration of the estate. 271 Dower, the 
indefeasible share, homestead allowance, and support allowance took on varying 
local characteristics as they were adopted either judicially or by statute,272 and 
divorce, has been called by one court "a further imponderable added to a list of imponderables." Re 
Besterman's Will Trusts, C.A., 1977 B. No. 5319 (Oct. 18, 1982) (available on LEXIS, Enggen library, 
Cases file). Litigation in many cases over the proper construction of such statutory terms as "reasonable 
provision," "substantial contribution," "maintenance," and "consideration," prompted another court to 
complain that 
[tJhis Act was designed to deal with a comparatively simple situation, and it is in danger of 
becoming a mass of technicalities. In my judgment this is very unfortunate and undesirable. 
The Act itself ... is quite simple .... It ought to be possible to arrive at a conclusion without 
getting involved in a mass of legal technicalities and complicated questions of construction .... 
It would be a pity, in my judgment, if litigation in these comparatively small estates should be 
encouraged by undue attention being paid to technical questions of construction. 
Harrington v. Gill, [1981]4 F.L.R. 265 (available on LEXIS, Enggen library, Cases file). For a discussion 
of some of the cases dealing with statutory construction of the Act's provisions, see Naresh, Dependants' 
Applicatiuns under the Inheritance (Provisiun for Family and Dependants) Act 1975, 96 LAW Q. REv. 534 
(1980). 
268. See, e.g., the discussion of costs, infra text accompanying notes 299-304. 
269. Simes, supra note 2, at 15. 
270. G. HASKINS, LAW AND AUTHORITY IN EARLY MASSACHUSETTS 180-82 (1960). 
271. The homestead exemption seeks 
to assure a permanent common home to members of a family by setting apart property 
belonging to the head of a family, up to a stated amount, and immunizing this property from 
the claims of general creditors and from the misfortunes or improvidence of the person who is 
head of the family. 
R. POWELL, REAL PROPERTY, para. 268 (Rohan ed. 1968). The homestead laws operate to protect a 
surviving spouse's claim to the property not only against creditors but also against contrary testamentary 
dispositions. Id. ; see generally Haskins, Homesuad Rights of a Surviving Spouse, 37 IOWA L. REV. 36 (1951). 
272. Dower was generally received from the common law, while the forced share came about by 
statute. Haskins, The Development of Commun Law Dower, 62 HARV. L. REV. 42, 55 (1948). Common-law 
dower was often made statutory, however, and there is authority for the proposition that some 
forced-share statutes as well were merely statements of a rule that existed in those states at common law. 
See Collins v. Carman, 5 Md. 503 (1854); THE BODY OF LIBERTIES 1641, at para. 79, reprinted in THE 
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have undergone change in some respects. 273 These devices have nonetheless 
retained certain shared features in all jurisdictions. 
Three of these shared features stand American succession law in marked 
contrast to the post-1975 English system. First, an American court has no 
discretion to vary the amount of protection afforded a claimant under these 
doctrines. 274 Second, the surviving spouse is the only family member who is 
granted protection: children may be easily disinherited,275 and no protection is 
afforded de facto dependants. For the surviving spouse who has been disinher-
ited, however, the American system works quite simply: he or she276 need simply 
claim the entitlements reserved by the above protective devices. 
B. Defects of the American System 
The devices available in most American states which automatically entitle a 
surviving spouse to certain fixed property rights in a decedent's estate have the 
advantage of providing the survivor with relatively certain results at little or no 
cost. Nonetheless, commentators have criticized the American system for several 
failings. First, the surviving spouse's share may be vulnerable to defeat by inter 
vivos transfer. 277 Second, a spouse who claims against the will may derail a plan by 
the testator to provide for his other dependants in the will, having adequately 
provided for his spouse in other ways.278 Third, the American system fails to 
COLONIAL LAWS OF MASSACHUSETTS 32, 50-51 (1889); THE BOOK OF THE GENERAL LAWES AND LIBERTYES 
CONCERNING THE INHABITANTS OF THE MASSACHUSETS 17-18 (1648 & photo. reprint 1975). See generally 
Simes, supra note 2, at 13-16. Compare Helmholz, supra note 13, at 665-67 (noting the customary nature 
of the legitim in medieval England). 
273. Dower, for instance, has been either abolished or substantially modified by legislation in all but 
eight states. 
274. The only discretion which a court may exercise is in the determination of the support allowance 
for the surviving spouse during administration of the estate. Rheinstein & Glendon, lnterspausal 
Relatiuns, in 4 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LA W, PERSONS AND FAMILY 142-43 (1980). 
275. See Rees, American Wills Statutes: ll, 46 VA. L. REv. 856, 892-98 (1960). 
276. The American protective devices were originally intended to protect the surviving wife, since 
generally she stood more in need of protection than a surviving husband, in whose name property was 
assumed to be held. Curtesy was a modified form of dower right which vested in the husband at his 
wife's death, but only when a live child had been born to the marriage. See generally Haskins, Curtesy in 
the United States, 100 V. PA. L. REV. 196 (1951). Where dower still exists, curtesy has been retained 
(although it is frequently called dower) for the husband, and has taken on the characteristics of dower. 
The forced share, homestead exemption, and support allowance laws are now held to entitle husbands 
as well as wives to protection. See Rheinstein & Glendon, lnterspousal Relatiuns, supra note 274, at 139 
n.743. 
277. See generally MACDONALD, FRAUD ON THE WIDOW'S SHARE (1960). Attempts to solve this problem 
have been made by the Vniform Probate Code art. II pt. 2, 8 V.L.A. 281 (1969), and similar statutes 
adopted in some states. Rheinstein & Glendon,lnterspausal Relatiuns,supra note 274, at 140-41. Rheins-
tein & Glendon cite Sanditen v. Sanditen, 496 P.2d 365 (Okla. 1972) and Muntgomery v. Michaels, 54 Ill.2d 
532,301 N .E.2d 465 (Ill. 1973), as evidence of judicial efforts to alleviate the problem in yet other states. 
ld. at 141. 
278. See Rheinstein & Glendon, lnterspousal Relatiuns, supra note 274, at 141-42; Browder, Recent 
Patterns of Testate Successiun in the United States and England, 67 MICH. L. REV. 1303, 1310 (1969). 
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protect children or other dependants, such as needy parents of the decedent. 279 
Fourth, the American system can produce results that seem out of harmony with 
the flexible division of property under modern divorce laws, as did the pre-1975 
English system. 280 Finally, the current American statutory scheme typically 
makes no allowance for the problems presented by recent trends in family 
behavior, such as increases in serial marriage and cohabitation. 
Thus the fixed nature of the survivors' property rights in a decedent's estate is 
the source of the American system's greatest advantages, predictability and low 
costs of administration. At the same time, these fixed rights are responsible for 
the system's flaws, chiefly those which result from an inability to take into account 
the equities of an individual situation. 
VII. JUDICIAL DISCRETION AS A REMEDY FOR DEFECTS PERCEIVED 
IN THE AMERICAN SYSTEM 
Some proponents of reform have advocated the adoption of English-style 
judicial discretion in estate distribution as a remedy for the failings they perceive 
in the American system. 281 Ajudge with discretionary powers could in theory set 
aside transfers made in fraud of survivors' shares. Under such a system, a court 
could also take into account provision made by the testator in other forms which 
should be set off against a survivor's share. A court with wide discretion could 
also wield its powers to ensure that a surviving spouse were treated as benevo-
lently as a divorced one, or that the survivors most in need were those who 
benefitted most. Finally, powers of discretion could enable a court to consider 
the actual family behavior of the decedent, in appropriate cases making allow-
ances for spouses and children of former marriages, cohabitants, needy parents, 
or other dependants. 
The 1975 English legislation itself explicitly attempts to avoid the problems of 
insensitivity to the individual situation which can be ascribed to the American 
statutory forced-share system. 282 Aside from its shortcomings in practice,283 how-
279. Except in Louisiana, the surviving spouse is the only party (other than a creditor) afforded any 
meaningful protection from disinheritance by current American practices. See La. Civ. Code Ann. arts. 
1493-95, 1617-24 (West 1952). Reform proposals have advocated expanding protection to include 
children and parents in need. See Haskell, The Power of Disinheritance: Proposal for Reform, 52 GEO. L.J. 
499 (1964); Simes,supra note 2, at 29-30; Cahn, Restraints on Disinheritance, 85 U. PA. L. REV. 139 (1936); 
MACDONALD, supra note 277, at 299-327. Children and parents in need are entitled to apply for 
maintenance under the English Inheritance Act of 1975, § 1(1)(c) and (e), as they were under the 
original New Zealand act. See Laufer, Flexible Restraints on Testamentary Freedom -A Report on Decedents' 
Family Maintenance LegislaJion, 69 HARV. L. REv. 277,282-83 (1955). 
280. Because the courts possess discretionary powers of property distribution under modern divorce 
laws, it is quite possible, for instance, that a spouse whose unfaithful behavior led to a divorce could be 
awarded a greater share of the marital assets than the faithful surviving spouse of a long-term marriage 
who inherits under a forced-share statute. 
281. See, e.g., Laufer, supra note 279, at 314; MACDONALD, supra note 277, at 299-327. 
282. Inheritance Act 1975, supra note 1, § 10 (inter vivos transfers); § 3(1) (directing the court to 
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ever, the English system may not be adaptable to American succession practice 
for several other reasons. First, discretionary distribution on divorce has pro-
duced dissatisfaction among litigants and in practice has revealed its defects both 
in England and in the United States. 284 Second, different judicial traditions make 
the entrusting of estate distribution to judges more problematic in the United 
States than in England. 285 Third, the English "loser pays" rule, which may 
facilitate the workings of the Act in England, is not followed in the United 
States. 286 
Judicial discretion to distribute property between spouses at divorce has been 
adopted in recent years in all common-law states in the United States,287 as well as 
in England. 288 The discretionary system of property distribution on divorce, 
however, has produced dissatisfaction among litigants289 and in practice has 
revealed defects both in England and in the United States. 290 Critics claim that 
the system of discretionary distribution leads to acrimony among parties who 
might otherwise have been able to settle their property-division matters without 
strife,291 and that the system is expensive both in terms of the litigants' own 
counsel fees 292 and in terms of court time. 293 Noting these problems, recent 
commentators have proposed a retreat from absolute discretion as the method of 
property distribution on divorce. 294 
consider a testator's other dispositions to the beneficiary and applicant); § 1 (entitling children and de 
facto dependants, including needy parents, to apply for provision); § 3(2) (directing the court to 
consider what an applicant would have gotten on divorce); and § 3(1)(g) (general discretionary power to 
account for the individual situation). 
283. See supra text accompanying notes 182-268. 
284. See infra text accompanying notes 287-94. 
285. See infra text accompanying note 298. 
286. See infra text accompanying notes 299-304. 
287. Freed, Equitable Distribution as of December 1982, 9 FAM. L. REP. (BN A) 400 I (1983); Mississippi 
and West Virginia, which at the time of Freed's December 1982 survey had not yet adopted equitable 
distribution, have apparently done so since that time. See Reeves v. Reeves, 410 So.2d 1300 (Miss. 1982); 
LaRue v. LaRue, 304 S.E.2d 312 (W.Va. 1983); Oldham,ls the Concept of Marital Property Outdated?, 22J. 
FAM. L. 263, 263 n.1 (1983-84). 
288. Matrimonial Causes (Property and Maintenance) Act, 1958, 6 & 7 Eliz. 2, ch. 35. 
289. See THE LAW COMMISSION, THE FINANCIAL CONSEQUENCES OF DIVORCE: THE BASIC POLICY, Law 
Com. No. 103, CMD. 8041, at 15-19 (1980); Glendon, Property Rights Upon Dissolution of Marriages and 
Informal Unions, in THE CAMBRIDGE LECTURES 1981, at 245, 247-50 (N. Eastham & B. Krivy ed. 1983). 
290. See generally THE LAW COMMISSION, THE FINANCIAL CONSEQUENCES OF DIVORCE, supra note 289; 
Glendon, Property Rights Upon Dissolution of Marriages and Informal Unions, supra note 289; Oldham, supra 
note 287; Note, Equitable Distribution vs. Fixed Rules: Marital Property Reform and the Uniform Marital 
Property Act, 23 B.C. L. REV. 761 (1982). 
291. See Glendon, Property Rights Upon Dissolution of Marriages and Informal Unions, supra note 289, at 
250; Oldham, supra note 287, at 268, 289, 300; Note, Equitable Distribution vs. Fixed Rules, supra note 290, 
at 776. 
292. See Glendon, Property Rights Upon Dissolution of Marriages and Informal Unions, supra note 289, at 
251-53; Oldham, supra note 287, at 268; Note, Equitable Distribution vs. Fixed Rules, supra note 290, at 
773-78. 
293. See Oldham, supra note 287, at 288; Note, Equitable Distribution vs. Fixed Rules, supra note 290, at 
776. 
294. See, e.g., K. GRAY, REALLOCATION OF PROPERTY ON DIVORCE 68-115 (1977); Glendon, Property 
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These same criticisms apply with equal force to the discretionary system of 
estate distribution embodied in the English Inheritance Act of 1975. Indeed, the 
English judiciary have recognized the tendency of the Act to encourage family 
strife295 and its expense to litigants. 296 In an attempt to cope with these problems, 
they have arguably limited the effectiveness of the Act. 297 
Differences perceived in the proper role for the judiciary may also pose 
discouragement for plans which would entrust American judges with discretion 
in the distribution of estates. The English judiciary have a long history of 
traditions in the exercise of discretion which vary in significant respects from the 
traditions of their American counterparts. Even proponents of reform have 
recognized the different judicial traditions as a barrier to the adoption of judicial 
discretion in this area, and have been unwilling to recommend that American 
judges be vested with discretion in estate distribution. 298 
In English practice, a court may order the unsuccessful party to bear both 
sides' costs of litigation. 299 This "loser pays" rule may have the effects of dis-
couraging patently unfounded litigation3oo and preserving the successful party's 
Rights Upon Dissolutiun of Marriages and Informal Uniuns, supra note 289, at 256-58; Note, Equitable 
Distributiun vs. Fixed Rules, supra note 290, at 767-78. 
295. See supra text accompanying notes 243-50. 
296. See supra text accompanying notes 251-66. 
297. See supra text accompanying notes 248-50, 264-68. 
298. Fratcher, supra note 36, at 1058; Browder, supra note 278, at 1307; Chaffin, Proteetiun of the 
Surviving Spouse, in COMPARATIVE PROBATE LAW STUDIES 187, 195-96 (1976). 
299. Supreme Court Act, 1981, ch. 54, § 51(1); Rules of the Supreme Court, Order 62, rule 3(2). The 
classic study of the English rule is Goodhart, Costs, 38 YALE L.J. 849 (1929). For an excellent recent study 
of the "loser pays" rule in various European systems (including England), see Pfennigstorf, The 
European Experience with Attorney Fee Shifting, 47 LAW & CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS 37 (1984). In practice, 
the costs of any reasonable claim or resistance may be ordered paid out of the estate. This is a limited 
exception to the "loser pays" rule, and is applicable only in probate actions. Goodhart, supra at 868; 2 F. 
POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, supra note 15, at 597. See also Re Wood, Chancery Division (April 2, 1982) 
(available on LEXIS, Enggen library, Cases file). When such an order to pay costs out of the estate is 
made, it not only decreases the successful party's share in the estate (where the entire estate is at issue), 
but may encourage any other litigation (in other cases) that is arguably reasonable. This result seems 
even more questionable than the American pattern of cost distribution, since the winner may end up 
paying not only his own costs of litigation but those of his opponent - at least where the entire estate is 
at issue, and the costs are thus to be taken from the winner's "share." The Court of Appeal recognized 
this problem in In re F1,<llard, deed., 1982 Fam. 42. The court stated that where the estate is a small one 
the onus on an applicant of satisfying the conditions of section 2 is very heavy indeed and these 
applications ought not to be launched unless there is (or there appears to be) a real chance of 
success, because the result of these proceedings simply diminishes the estate and is a great 
hardship on the beneficiaries if they are ultimately successful in litigation. For that reason I 
would be disposed to think that judges should reconsider the practice of ordering the costs of 
both sides in these cases to be paid out of the estate. That is probate practice; this is something 
quite different. I think judges should look very closely indeed at the merits of each application 
before ordering that the estate pays the applicant'S costs if the application is unsuccessful. 
Id. at 46. 
300. In the cases of applications brought under the 1975 Inheritance Act, courts seem to have been 
applying the traditional exception to the "loser pays" rule, ordering costs to be paid out of the estate. 
The rule has therefore had presumably little discouraging effect on litigation. See supra text accompany-
ing notes 251-66. Following the Court of Appeal's recommendation in In re Fullard, deed., 1982 Fam. 42, 
46, however, the courts may begin to apply the rule to cases brought under the Act. See supra note 299. 
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share of an estate. 301 
In America, each party traditionally pays its own costs of litigation. 302 If 
survivors had to bring lawsuits to recover provision from an estate, as under the 
English system, the successful party's share would necessarily be reduced by the 
costs of litigating his side of the dispute. That the costs may be considerable is 
apparent from the English experience303 and the experience with discretionary 
property distribution on divorce. 304 The legal fees generated by a complex and 
protracted contest could thus considerably deplete even a medium-sized estate. 
If the purpose of restrictions on testamentary freedom is family provision, as it is 
in England, then a procedure which results in the depletion of an estate by legal 
fees seems inappropriate. Thus the absence of a "loser pays" rule to discourage 
excessive litigation and preserve the taker's share may militate against any system 
of family-protection devices which requires, as does the current English system, 
the bringing of a lawsuit. 
Given these considerations, it is far from clear that whatever stands to be 
gained from the adoption of the discretionary method of estate distribution 
would not be outweighed by the loss of the fixed-share system's advantages of 
predictability and low cost. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
The 1975 English Inheritance Act is a detailed attempt to provide family 
protection from disinheritance. In order to take account of the complexity and 
variety of modern English social and economic life, the Act gives judges discre-
tion to make "reasonable financial provision" out of a decedent's estate for family 
and de facto dependants. The Act thus makes it theoretically possible to arrive at 
the most equitable distribution in each individual case. 
The decisions reported in the first eight years of practice under the new 
English legislation, however, call into question its effectiveness and raise the 
issue, as Max Rheinstein did in 1974 about discretionary distribution on divorce, 
of whether the price of individualized justice is simply too high. 305 
The family-oriented protective devices available in most American jurisdic-
tions, by contrast, preserve certain fixed property rights for the surviving spouse 
only. This system thus makes no attempt to account for recent trends in family 
behavior, and has been criticized for a number of other failings. Some propo-
301. See, e.g. ,In re Fullard, decd., 1982 Fam. 42, 46 (recommending that the costs of an unsuccessful 
applicant not be awarded out of the estate, in order to preserve the taker's share). 
302. See generally Goodhart, supra note 299; Leubsdorf, Toward a History of the American Rule on 
Attorney Fee Recovery, 47 LAW & CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS 9 (1984); see also the other articles collected in 
the excellent symposium on Attorney Fee Shifting, 47 LAW & CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS (1984). 
303. See supra text accompanying notes 251-66. 
304. See supra text accompanying notes 287-94. 
305. Rheinstein, Division of Marital Property, 12 WILLAMETTE L.J. 413, 432 (1976). 
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nents of reform have suggested English-style judicial discretion as a possible 
remedy for some of the defects they perceive in the American system. 
While the English Act would seem well-equipped to remedy these defects, its 
questionable success at home should give pause to American legislators consider-
ing the adoption of judicial discretion in estate distribution. Furthermore, the 
English system may not be suited to American probate practice for several other 
reasons, including the experience with equitable distribution, the different judi-
cial traditions of England and America, and the differences in allocation of legal 
costs. 
Richard R. Schaul-Yoder 
ApPENDIX 
Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependants) Act 1975 
1975 Chapter 63 
An Act to make fresh provision for empowering the court to make orders for the making out of the 
estate of a deceased person of provision for the spouse, former spouse, child, child of the famiy or 
dependant of that person; and for matters connected therewith. [12th November 1975] 
BE IT ENACTED by the Queen's most Excellent Majesty, by and with the advice and consent of the Lords 
Spiritual and Temporal, and Commons, in this present Parliament assembled, and by the authority of 
the same, as follows: -
I. - (I) Where after the commencement of this Act a person dies domiciled in England and Wales 
and is survived by any of the following persons: -
(a) the wife or husband of the deceased; 
(b) a former wife or former husband of the deceased who has not remarried; 
(c) a child of the deceased; 
(d) any person (not being a child of the deceased) who, in the case of any marriage to which the 
deceased was at any time a party, was treated by the deceased as a child of the family in relation 
to that marriage; 
(e) any person (not being a person included in the foregoing paragraphs of this subsection) who 
immediately before the death of the deceased was being maintained, either wholly or partly, by 
the deceased; that person may apply to the court for an order under section 2 of this Act on the 
ground that the disposition of the deceased's estate effected by his will or the law relating to 
intestacy, or the combination of his will and that law, is not such as to make reasonable financial 
provision for the applicant. 
(2) In this Act "reasonable financial provision" -
(a) in the case of an application made by virtue of subsection (I)(a) above by the husband or wife of 
the deceased (except where the marriage with the deceased was the subject of a decree of 
judicial separation and at the date of death the decree was in force and the separation was 
continuing), means such financial provision as it would be reasonable in all the circumstances of 
the case for a husband or wife to receive, whether or not that provision is required for his or 
her maintenance; 
(b) in the case of any other application made by virtue of subsection (I) above, means such financial 
provision as it would be reasonable in all the circumstances of the case for the applicant to 
receive for his maintenance. 
(3) For the purposes of subsection (I)(e) above, a person shall be treated as being maintained by the 
deceased, either wholly or partly, as the case may be, if the deceased, otherwise than for full valuable 
consideration, was making a substantial contribution in money or money's worth towards the reasonable 
needs of that person. 
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2. - (I) Subject to the provisions of this Act, where an application is made for an order under this 
section, the court may, if it is satisfied that the disposition of the deceased's estate effected by his will or 
the law relating to intestacy, or the combination of his will and that law, is not such as to make reasonable 
financial provision for the applicant, make anyone or more of the following orders: -
(a) an order for the making to the applicant out of the net estate of the deceased of such periodical 
payments and for such term as may be specified in the order; 
(b) an order for the payment to the applicant out of that estate of a lump sum of such amount as 
may be so specified; 
(c) an order for the transfer to the applicant of such property comprised in that estate as may be so 
specified; 
(d) an order for the settlement for the benefit of the applicant of such property comprised in that 
estate as may be so specified; 
(e) an order for the acquisition out of property comprised in that estate of such property as may be 
so specified and for the transfer of the property so acquired to the applicant or for the 
settlement thereof for his benefit; 
(f) an order varying any anti-nuptial or post-nuptial settlement (including such a settlement made 
by will) made on the parties to a marriage to which the deceased was one of the parties, the 
variation being for the benefit of the surviving party to that marriage, or any child of that 
marriage, or any person who was treated by the deceased as a child of the family in relation to 
that marriage. 
(2) An order under subsection (I)(a) above providing for the making out of the net estate of the 
deceased of periodical payments may provide for -
(a) payments of such amount as may be specified in the order, 
(b) payments equal to the whole of the income of the net estate or of such portion thereof as may 
be so specified, 
(c) payments equal to the whole of the income of such part of the net estate as the court may direct 
to be set aside or appropriated for the making out of the income thereof of payments under 
this section, or may provide for the amount of the payments or any of them to be determined in 
any other way the court thinks fit. 
(3) Where an order under subsection (l)(a) above provides for the making of payments of an amount 
specified in the order, the order may direct that such part of the net estate as may be sp specified shall be 
set aside or appropriated for the making out of the income thereof of those payments; but no larger 
part of the net estate shall be so set aside or appropriated than is sufficient, at the date of the order, to 
produce by the income thereof the amount required for the making of those payments. 
(4) An order under this section may contain such consequential and supplemental provisions as the 
court thinks necessary or expedient for the purpose of giving effect to the order or for the purpose of 
securing that the order operates fairly as between one beneficiary of the estate of the deceased and 
another and may, in particular, but without prejudice to the generality of this subsection -
(a) order any person who holds any property which forms part of the net estate of the deceased to 
make such payment or transfer such property as may be specified in the order; 
(b) vary the disposition of the deceased's estate effected by the will or the law relating to intestacy, 
or by both the will and the law relating to intestacy, in such manner as the court thinks fair and 
reasonable having regard to the provisions of the order and all the circumstances of the case; 
(c) confer on the trustees of any property which is the subject of an order under this section such 
powers as appear to the court to be necessary or expedient. 
3. - (I) Where an application is made for an order under section 2 of this Act, the court shall, in 
determining whether the disposition of the deceased's estate effected by his will or the law relating to 
intestacy, or the combination of his will and that law, is such as to make reasonable financial provision 
for the applicant and, if the court considers that reasonable financial provision has not been made, in 
determining whether and in what manner it shall exercise its powers under that section, have regard to 
the following matters, that is to say -
(a) the financial resources and financial needs which the applicant has or is likely to have in the 
foreseeable future; 
(b) the financial resources and financial needs which any other applicant for an order under 
section 2 of this Act has or is likely to have in the foreseeable future; 
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(c) the financial resources and financial needs which any beneficiary of the estate of the deceased 
has or is likely to have in the foreseeable future; 
(d) any obligations and responsibilities which the deceased had towards any applicant for an order 
under the said section 2 or towards any beneficiary of the estate of the deceased; 
(e) the size and nature of the net estate of the deceased; 
(f) any physical or mental disability of any applicant for an order under the said section 2 or any 
beneficiary of the estate of the deceased; 
(g) any other matter, including the conduct of the applicant or any other person, which in the 
circumstances of the case the court may consider relevant. 
(2) Without prejudice to the generality of paragraph (g) of subsection (I) above, where an application 
for an order under section 2 of this Act is made by virtue of section 1(I)(a) or 1(1)(b) of this Act, the 
court shall, in addition to the matters specifically mentioned in paragraphs (a) to (f) of that subsection, 
have regard to -
(a) the age of the applicant and the duration of the marriage; 
(b) the contribution made by the applicant to the welfare of the family of the deceased, including 
any contribution made by looking after the home or caring for the family; and, in the case of an 
application by the wife or husband of the deceased, the court shall also, unless at the date of 
death a decree of judicial separation was in force and the separation was continuing, have 
regard to the provision which the applicant might reasonably have expected to receive if on the 
day on which the deceased died the marriage, instead of being terminated by death, had been 
terminated by a decree of divorce. 
(3) Without prejudice to the generality of paragraph (g) of subsection (I) above, where an application 
for an order under section 2 of this Act is made by virtue of section 1(I)(c) or 1(I)(d) of this Act, the 
court shall, in addition to the matters specifically mentioned in paragraphs (a) to (f) of that subsection, 
have regard to the manner in which the applicant was being or in which he might expect to be educated 
or trained, and where the application is made by virtue of section 1(I)(d) the court shall also have regard 
(a) to whether the deceased had assumed any responsibility for the applicant'S maintenance and, if 
so, to the extent to which and the basis upon which the deceased assumed that responsibility 
and to the length of time for which the deceased discharged that responsibility; 
(b) to whether in assuming and discharging that responsibility the deceased did so knowing that 
the applicant was not his own child; 
(c) to the liability of any other person to maintain the applicant. 
(4) Without prejudice to the generality of paragraph (g) of subsection (I) above, where an application 
for an order under section 2 of this Act is made by virtue of section 1(I)(e) of this Act, the court shall, in 
addition to the matters specifically mentioned in paragraphs (a) to (f) of that subsection, have regard to 
the extent to which and the basis upon which the deceased assumed responsibility for the maintenance 
of the applicant and to the length of time for which the deceased discharged that responsibility. 
(5) In considering the matters to which the court is required to have regard under this section, the 
court shall take into account the facts as known to the court at the date of the hearing. 
(6) In considering the financial resources of any person for the purposes of this section the court 
shall take into account his earning capacity and in considering the financial needs of any person for the 
purposes of this section the court shall take into account his financial obligations and responsibilities. 
